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This thesis aims to analyze demagogic politics and its reinforcing premises--Fear, 
Prejudice, Ignorance--through a case study involving the Italian politician, Matteo Salvini. This 
political practice that can be traced back to Ancient Athens, nevertheless, remains a potent force 
and an important explanation for contemporary political phenomena. By exploiting the emotions 
of the common people, rational analysis gives way to ill-considered passion, enabling the 
demagogue to secure popular support. At a time when right-wing populism has surged in 
Western Democracy, many have conflated the terms ‘demagogue’ and ‘populist’. However, in 
order to maintain the order and stability of democracy, it is imperative to maintain and 
comprehend the distinction between these terms.  
Specifically, the thesis will provide an extensive analysis of demagoguery, including its 
historical origins and its reliance upon the unholy trinity--Fear, Prejudice, Ignorance--. The 
political career of Matteo Salvini under Lega will be offered as a demonstrative paradigm of the 
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Introduction: Democracy as a Distortion  
Democracy is considered one of the best indicators for measuring progress of a 
nation-state, especially in the ‘Western World’. Indeed, one of the foundational principles of the 
United States’ foreign policy has always been promoting democracy. However, the concept of 
democracy is no longer bound by its definition. In fact, it has developed an extended meaning 
based on the assumption that it directly translates to the principle of absolute popular sovereignty 
(Robson 41). In this way, the concept has transformed from a means to an end, into an end in 
itself. To emphasize, democracy quite literally means a form of government that enables 
constituents to elect their governing legislation. Although this facilitates civic participation, it 
does not guarantee that the opinions of citizens will have direct authority over government 
decisions.  
At a time where right-wing populism and nationalism have surged in Western 
Democracies, distorted meanings have become ubiquitous. Part of the explanation for this can be 
attributed to “unchecked” democracy and its ability to produce demagogic distortions that 
effectively corrupts the true meaning of this form of government. In doing so, the demagogue 
violates the reality of human knowledge as being permanently imperfect. Democracy is not 
advanced as a mere set of procedures distinct from an end in itself, but instead affirms, “the 
constructivist-rationalist error that equates democracy with notions of popular sovereignty” 
(Robson 41).  
Moreover, democracy, in this sense, focuses on human society, the order we observe, as a 
constructed order or what the Austrian economist, Friedrich Hyack, refers to as​ taxis ​(Robson 
41)​. ​In order to understand the authentic value of polity, one must accept the imperfections of 
political organization. Otherwise, one would have to assume the objective of polity is to 
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manufacture a utopia. Not only does this contradict the imperfections of human knowledge, but it 
would require “one or more individuals [to] possess complete knowledge of the end desires of all 
individuals, the means available to them, and all other relevant facts in all conceivable particular 
situations” (Robson 42). None of these necessary capabilities can legitimately be taken as 
characteristics of human nature. 
Therefore, due to this lack of human knowledge, order in human societies cannot be 
constructed, but instead, must be spontaneous or grown, and is what Hyack refers to as the 
kosmos ​(Robson 42)​.​ Inevitably, human decision will never be completely rational due to the 
incapacity to obtain universal knowledge. Instead, human knowledge is based on situational 
facts, which will always prove to be incomplete, especially in the realm of politics. Provided this, 
it is imperative that individuals are guaranteed the freedom to reach their capabilities until 
coercion becomes necessary. Because the capabilities obtained by one individual may be 
different for another, it is specific situational fact that can contribute to the greater ‘good’ and 
‘truth’ of society.  
In order for this to fully transpire, the corrupted meaning of democracy cannot be 
proliferated due to its disregard of the ​kosmos ​principle. When this corrupted meaning becomes 
normalized, so does the threat of a rising demagogue. In other words, if the ​taxis ​is reinforced, 
then the demagogue’s ‘savior’ rhetoric that implies he/she knows the true “will of the people” 
may be accepted as fact. Not only does this become dangerous for the growth of the greater 
‘good’ and ‘truth’ of human knowledge, but to the fabric of democracy itself. Such a leader does 
not promote the plurality of interests that contend in a free and democratic society, but instead 
manipulates and even disregards individual facts.  
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Certainly, demagogic politics is not a modern concept. Rather, it reflects a dynamism 
inherent in democracy from its beginning in classical antiquity. Therefore, in order to deepen our 
understanding of demagoguery, continuous research is necessary. In an attempt to provide 
evidence for this, my research was conducted through a case study: the career of Italian far-right 
leader, Matteo Salvini. Specifically, my project argues that the emerging impact of globalization, 
with its tendency to homogenize ethnic and cultural distinctions, has promoted a political 
environment conducive to far-right demagoguery.  
Take, for example, the term “Italian”. This one word can have many, yet very definitive 
meanings. One might think of history, culture, art, or even fashion. The word has positive 
connotations around the world and as such affords a degree of honor and pride to anyone 
self-identifying as “Italian”. However,  as international relationships advance and as traditional 
cultural distinctions become less distinct and less meaningful, parochial anxieties are easily 
inflamed by those promoting ethno-cultural nationalism. All of which represents a rare 
opportunity for the likes of a demagogue such as Matteo Salvini.  
 
 
Historical Origins: Ancient Athens, Cleon  
First, in order to fully approach this understanding of demagogic politics, the premise of 
the word “demagogue” must be well-established. Naturally, one must look to the genesis of 
democracy, being it is a prerequisite for this political trend to take place. More specifically, one 
must look to the 5th century BCE in Ancient Athens. At this time, the Athenians had become 
frustrated with their oligarchic government due to the corruption of power and 
underrepresentation of the people. That being said, they began to develop revolutionary 
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principles that would allow civic participation to take place in the political sector, creating the 
first form of democracy. Nonetheless, the name democracy was provided because it quite 
literally translates to “rule by the people”.  
However, even though this new form of government was groundbreaking, it was not 
exempt from error. In fact, in 380 BCE Plato critiques Athenian democracy in his book, ​The 
Republic,​ due to the increased ability for uneducated citizens to make decisions that required 
advanced knowledge. By extension, Plato did not agree with Athenian direct democracy, but 
argued a government should embody the best governing principles through a meritocracy. 
Elected representation would be able to filter the uneducated commoners from knowledgeable 
politicians that would be able to best fulfill the job on behalf of the people. Even though he was 
contesting direct democracy, Plato wanted to clearly separate his idea from the type of 
representatives in the previous Athenian oligarchy. As Plato was a philosopher, he believed that 
those in power should be leading the people by way of truth and reasoning, not based on class, 
status, or numbers. 
Notably, Plato’s idea of a republic did not just develop in response to the creation of 
democracy, but to a movement that was advanced by it: sophistry. Because the structure of a 
direct democracy allows citizens to have equal participation, it also awards their rhetoric equal 
legitimacy. Therefore, as democracy grew stronger, the appreciation for sophistry did as well. 
Such appreciation that the sophists were the first to receive payment for their so called 
“intellectual” conversations. Sophists, however, were not remarkable for their extensive 
knowledge, but for the way in which they were able to communicate or convince the legitimacy 
of their claims. This popular way of teaching “instantly created a market for a new form of 
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education emphasizing the power of words” (Soupios 270).  To elaborate, the sophist was one 
who developed his public speaking into a​ techne​, allowing him to become a master of rhetoric. 
This ​techne​ not only enabled the sophist to disguise the lack of rationale supporting his 
teachings, it also suggested that “truth, understood as an abiding, universal body of insight did 
not exist” (Soupios 283).  
Despite an absence of a common logic among sophists, there was one overarching 
premise for the the sophistical teachings: truth is deeply rooted in human opinion. The 
epistemology of the sophists was entirely built on human experiences through the senses, 
resulting in an inconsistent truth. In other words, the subjective knower will almost always vary 
with his perspective in comparison to another, so an abiding universal truth is not even plausible. 
In fact, Gorgias, one of the most famous sophists of this time period, addressed this directly 
when he said, “it is impossible, if anything exists, for it to be known and, if it is known, no one 
could reveal it to another”. Here, Gorgias, like many other sophists, demonstrates a strong 
skepticism on the ability to discover a real meaning to life, reflecting a moral nihilistic view. 
Moral nihilism suggests a fundamental incapacity to arrive at any universal system of truth and 
value.  
Moreover, ancient Athenian democracy found itself vulnerable to people who could 
appeal to the public with their words, whether their motives were genuine or designed to gain 
political power. Because sophists were not qualified to provide proper answers to complex 
problems, they began to oversimplify them and their solutions. Naturally, this appealed to the 
public by making more people feel closer to politics than before, being that they could now 
conceptualize what they couldn’t before. In addition, it placed current philosophers and other 
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intellectuals in an unfavorable light, given their elitist connotations.That being said, in the 4th 
century BCE, this created the first favorable environment for demagoguery.  
In 429 BCE, due to the popularity of rhetoric, an Athenian general became the leader of 
the established democracy. Thanks to a lack of primary sources, there are contested arguments 
on the portrayal of Cleon and the leader he may have been in actuality. However, of these few 
sources is one that is considered the “first true historian” due to his consistently accurate 
recordings: Thucydides. Therefore, it is through his writings that Cleon’s career is portrayed, and 
although it may not be very generous, it can be rendered credible. Thus, who was Cleon? 
Thucydides records Cleon as a unique figure to enter into a political leadership position. Unique 
because of the way in which he portrayed himself as an outsider to the professional politicians— 
a man of the common people. Although he appealed to many people for this reason, Thucydides 
criticised him for legitimizing himself as a political leader through hollow rhetoric.  
Notably, Cleon was the son of a wealthy leather merchant and tanner, providing for him a 
very plentiful life since birth. Once he was elected general, he advanced very aggressive 
procedures. More specifically, the Peloponnesian War was taking place while Cleon rose to 
power, and during this time, he made his views very apparent. Perhaps one of the most 
well-known speeches by Cleon was during the Mytilenean Debate. In 427 BCE, the Mytileneans 
had just surrendered after revolting against their alliance with the Athenians. Due to their revolt, 
there was a proposition that all the Mytilenean men should be put to death, while the women and 
children enslaved as punishment. However, due to the severity of the punishment and historical 
alliance, it was reconsidered, encouraging a public debate between Cleon and another Athenian 
political figure, Diodotus.  
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To begin, Thucydides introduces Cleon and his position as the one who advanced “the 
motion of putting the Mitylenians to death, the most violent man at Athens, and at that time by 
far the most powerful with the commons” (Thucydides 151). That being said, Cleon was clearly 
seen as a powerful figure, and in a way that could potentially harm the people of Athens. In this 
debate, Cleon attests to his superior credibility by insisting that “ordinary men usually manage 
public affairs better than their more gifted fellows”, referring to the more established political 
leaders (Thucydides 152). By saying this, he is not even speaking on the actual issue being 
debated, but focusing on delegitimizing his opposition in order to persuade his audience. This 
tactic is specific to demagoguery because of its deviation from providing facts, and instead 
evoking emotion.  
After Cleon was finished, Diodotus followed with his reasons for sparing the lives of the 
Mytileneons. In his speech, there was more emphasis on the actual interests of the city-state. In 
fact, he emphasized how there was no benefit for the Athenians to commit such a killing, since 
many of the Mytileneons were not directly involved in the revolt and death does not translate 
into justice. Fortunately, this logical stance resonated with the people, and the outcome of the 
decision reflected Diodotus’ position. Notably, this ancient debate on the justification of the 
death penalty is both incredible and revealing. Certainly, Diodotus’ more comprehensive 
knowledge disproved “Cleon's idea that in punishment the claims of justice and expediency can 
both be satisfied” (Thucydides 158). It is from such records, Cleon’s reliance on emotional 




Theory: Establishing the Unholy Trinity--Fear, Prejudice, Ignorance 
That being said It is important to note that the meaning of the word, demagogue, literally 
translates to “leader of the people”, but the connotations that have been attached to it overtime 
have transformed it into something much stronger. Today, a demagogue is considered a leader 
who arises through the reliance on three main pillars: Fear, Prejudice, and Ignorance. Just as in 
the case of Cleon, the title is not simply given based on his identity as a man of the commons, 
but because of the need to appeal to specific emotions, despite validity. Thus, the use of rhetoric 
is extremely relevant, if not the most fundamental tool for the demagogue. However, just as J. 
Justin Gustainis indicates in his research surrounding this subject, it is important to make a 
distinction between demagoguery and agitation (155). Because both, agitation and demagoguery, 
may result in similar effects by criticizing what is considered status quo, the two terms become 
closely related in many circumstances.  
However, a distinction must be made clear, being that “although the agitator may resort 
to demagoguery, agitative rhetoric is not, in itself, demagogic” (Gustainis 155). As mentioned, 
agitators seek to challenge the current state of affairs, but it is the way in which they do so that 
allows them to be categorized as a demagogue or not. Demagoguery is specific due to the 
leader’s tactics in achieving public support. More specifically, the trajectory of appealing to 
public emotions that are rooted in fear, prejudice, and ignorance. The heavy reliance on these 
three pillars is what distinguishes the demagogue from being an agitator.  
Nevertheless, the premise of demagoguery may not be obvious due to the pre-existing 
emotional aspects of political debate. Although, with attentive examination, it is quite apparent 
that emotional manipulation can be held responsible for gaining unusual popular support. Since 
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the first pillar (fear) must be understood to reinforce the other two pillars, the importance of 
prejudice will be explained first. Provided this, it is imperative to understand that the 
environment in which a demagogue rises to power is during a period of turmoil or unrest. In this 
way, the development of an identifiable “enemy” becomes necessary for oversimplified solutions 
to be referenced in public rhetoric. In other words, targeting a scapegoat for the people to find 
emotional unity is very easy at a time of instability.  
In order to do this, the selection of the “enemy” is not done randomly, but tactically in the 
sense that it is chosen based on existing hatreds and fears. This is where the aspect of prejudice 
becomes relevant, being that the targeted enemies are conjured from deep-rooted hatred. For 
instance, during the early 1950s in the United States, Senator Joseph McCarthy capitalized on 
prejudice against communists by accusing and charging citizens of conspiring with the 
Communist Party. Senator McCarthy was very successful at creating this hysteria of growing 
communism and “legitimizing” it into a national threat, so much that it allowed him to unfairly 
try and convict citizens based on his own accusations. However, this was only possible because 
of the prevailing turmoil of the containment period following WWII. To elaborate, when people 
find themselves overcome with powerful prejudicial emotions, their rationality often diminishes 
alarmingly.  
With a political environment vulnerable to hatred at the cost of rationality, the pillar of 
ignorance can be understood. Now that the demagogue has distracted the people from 
logical-reasoning, he/she does not have to be overly concerned with the actual facts or truth of 
the issues being discussed. Therefore, oversimplifying rhetoric targets the vulnerable scapegoat 
and will not be criticized by the average person. In fact, the demagogue will be praised instead 
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for their ability to “say it how it is”. This reveals not only the cunning nature of the leader, but of 
the necessary ignorance of the common people. Being that their support derives from the masses, 
the crowd to which they appeal is of the largest majority, the common person or middle-class.  
Moreover, the demagogue will ignite an opposition movement against more educated 
individuals, whom one could classify as “elites” or “professionals”. Unfortunately, their common 
status only works to the leader’s advantage because it unites the common people even more, 
creating a feeling of “us” against “them” once again. Therefore, when confronted with an 
argument regarding the actual facts of a subject, the demagogue will survive through the use of 
“pseudo-reasoning”. In this way, the “facts” can be acknowledged and may sound good “to the 
untutored reader, [but] are in fact logically fallacious” (Gustainis 159). This is also revealed 
when there is a reference to evidence, done in a brief and careless manner. Although they may 
insist it supports their argument, it is not discussed in detail because it will not in fact be “proof” 
of anything. Just as Senator McCarthy used stacks of “lists” as evidence for his communist 
accusations, they were really no more than just names on pieces of paper.  
Clearly, the demagogue is cunning for the way he manipulates the ignorance of average 
citizens. The emphasis on pathos over logos, specifically surrounding feelings of hate, have 
enabled this process to unfold. However, the third pillar is ultimately foundational, being that 
fear is what makes people vulnerable to being ignorant in the presence of prejudice. What this 
means is that fear is the ultimate driving force in achieving the support of the people. Going back 
to the prerequisites of demagoguery, there must be some sort of turmoil present. Indeed, the 
establishment of an “enemy”, as mentioned, is the immediate tactic of the demagogue. What is it 
that makes him so successful? The answer is fear.  
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To elaborate, even though there may be strong existing prejudice, it is fear that mobilizes 
this prejudice into something that is acted upon. Prejudice is not uniquely present due to 
demagoguery, but is uniquely acted upon due to the existing fear that the demagogue is claiming 
to eradicate. With reference to the McCarthyism era, U.S. citizens did loathe  communists, but 
they were not afraid of them. What people were actually afraid of was communism eventually 
infiltrating the U.S. government. Even though there was never a real threat of this on U.S. soil, 
Senator McCarthy identified this fear as an opportunity to mobilize the existing prejudice into an 
entire movement.  
Provided this, it is when the people are feeling most weak that they look to a strong 
leader to guide them out of hardship. However, whether the turmoil is in fact real or constructed 
such as during McCarthyism, the demagogue is able to portray the notion of being the audience’s 
savior. In other words, once the people are convinced of the proclaimed crisis, the demagogue 
will instill the idea that drastic action must occur in order to eradicate the threat. Interestingly, 
this call for action usually results in the audience giving him/her political power (Gustainis 158). 
This is extremely detrimental because it transforms the demagogue into the solution and, 
simultaneously, a movement. Now, not only are people united by the establishment of fear 
instilled by the demagogue, they are also afraid of his/her potential capabilities. Therefore, fear 
could be recognized as the most important pillar of a demagogue because without it, one could 
argue, the other two could not properly develop.  
With this, there is a different political ideology that must be made distinct from 
demagoguery: populism. At a time when populism has become a global trend in the Western 
world, in the media, and throughout literature, these two terms get used interchangeably. 
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However, it is important to note, especially in the case of Italy, the difference that distinguishes a 
demagogue from just a populist. One may recognize the similarities: each develops in a period of 
unrest, identifies a common enemy, and claims to be a political outsider representing the 
common people. These are all in fact true for both ideologies, so why should we not conflate 
populist and demagogue leaders? 
Distinctly, populism is an ideology that is based on the notion of dividing the regime into 
two parts: the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’ (Mudde 7). In this way, the populist always 
aligns himself with the majority and in doing so, attempts to unite them by targeting the powerful 
elite. Although this identification of a common enemy resonates with demagoguery, the common 
enemy for populism remains constant. In other words, a demagogue may also target the elite, but 
this specific notion is not fundamental to its definition. Along with this, populism is more of a 
movement in itself and does not highlight the role of a particular leader. Whereas, demagoguery 
places more emphasis on the political figure, emphasizing the role of a  “savior”.  
Although it may seem as if populist ideology might be challenging mainstream ideas of 
western democracy, it is imperative to understand that it is not. When closely examined, 
populism is actually well-connected to mainstream ideas and opinions. For this reason, it is the 
degree to which it holds the same values as western democracy that differs. To elaborate, 
populism doesn’t oppose mainstream ideas, but radicalizes them (Mudde 9). By doing this, the 
movement is able to utilize consistent political concerns.  
The populist ideology centers around anti-establishment sentiments, claiming to fight for 
the ‘will of the people’ against undemocratic institutional constraints that protect the minorities 
(Mudde 7). That being said, populism classifies ‘the people’ into one homogenous group that 
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shares the same common sense and morality. Anything that does not align with these sentiments 
is seen as unrepresentative of the people. This is problematic because it denies the plurality of 
interests within society.  To elucidate, elitism and pluralism can be classified as the opposite of 
populism. Elitism divides society by the same groups, however, it distinguishes the pure elite 
from the corrupt people. Along with this, the pluralist ideology recognize diverse groups with 
interests and opinions that must come to a consensus. Both of these contradict the entire premise 
of populism. 
Rejecting any notion of diversity among the interest of ‘the people’ as legitimate might 
be considered ironically undemocratic. However, this is not necessarily true. Populism is 
democratic in the sense that it is supporting mainstream views held by the people, but illiberal in 
the sense that it excludes issues concerning the elites, who are still apart of society. Therefore, 
populism is an “illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism” (Mudde 58). Whether 
in the form of far-right or far-left populism, both exclude the elite. Although, it is their 
classification of the elite that may differ.  
In the case of far-right wing populism, the main issues that are made apparent are 
immigration, corruption, and security. In doing so, they demand a repoliticization, that will in 
turn, leave society more polarized than before. Throughout Europe, far-right populist movements 
have begun to disrupt long-established governments. Due to deep historical roots, attitudes of 
nativism have remained among European countries. Although this does not necessarily have to 
translate into racism, it does provide a specific view on immigration. In fact, according to the 
Eurobarameter 47.1 (1997), “some 20 percent [of EU-15] supported wholesale repatriation’ 
(Mudde 8). In other words, even if they were born in a given European state and were considered 
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legal citizens, non-immigrant citizens believed immigrants should be sent back to their country 
of origin.  
Therefore, it may seem as if the radical right-wing populist ideology might be 
challenging mainstream ideas of western democracy, it is imperative to understand that this is 
not the case. When closely examined, right-wing populism is actually well-connected to 
mainstream ideas and opinions. Instead, it is the degree to which it holds the same values as 
western democracy that differs. To elaborate, radical right-wing populism doesn’t oppose 
mainstream ideas, but radicalizes them (Mudde 9). By doing so, the movement is able to exploit 
well-established political concerns to advance their campaign, enabling an environment for a 
demagogue to emerge.  
 
Case Study: Italy, the Career of Matteo Salvini  
Given the underlying passions of populist movements, they invariably represent fertile 
opportunity for demagogues. Fear, Prejudice, Ignorance can be identified as the unholy trinity of 
a demagogue, and all three can utilize populism to strengthen support even more. In other words, 
through strategic emotional manipulation, the demagogue can then develop the movement into 
his own beast. It is specifically this process of demagogue configuration that will be traced a 
hereby way of a case study involving the contemporary Italian demagogue, Matteo Salvini.  
To begin, it is imperative to understand the political trends from the end of a historical 
turning point in Italian politics: the dictatorship of Mussolini. On “July 25, 1943, Italy’s Fascist 
regime ended, when Benito Mussolini was arrested on the order of the king, Victor Emmanuel 
III” (Foot 9). Finally, Italy was liberated from the strict regime that embedded right-wing 
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nationalism into the country’s core for decades. However, although the importance of 
establishing checks and balances within the government was made apparent after the reign of 
Mussolini, there weren’t any reports of Italians being prosecuted for war crimes. Instead, there 
was more of an emphasis on the process of forgetting. Therefore,“Fascism was gone, but many 
Fascists were still around” (Foot 10).  
Moreover, the process of forgetting took place through democratization when a 
referendum was held in 1946 and resulted in the creation of a Republic. Following this, a 
constitution was drafted and established to ensure that Italy would not be vulnerable to a 
dictatorship ever again. By 1948, the first elections were held, ushering in a new political 
dominance that would remain until 1994, directly resembling the Cold War conflict (Foot 10). 
After WWII, and Mussolini’s Fascist regime, there was a large push for socialism to succeed. 
Thus, Italian politics quickly became a playground for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to 
demonstrate power. During this period, the Christian Democratic Party gained large support in 
opposition to the other popular political party, “Partito Comunista” (the Communist Party).  
As expected, both parties were funded externally by the countries that supported each 
ideology during this time period. To elaborate, the United States and the Vatican strongly funded 
the Christian Democratic party, while Russia gave money to the Communist Party platform. 
However, in 1994, it was revealed that these parties were receiving such significant funding from 
these actors along with others, that it was nationally broadcasted. Even though Italy maintained 
an anti-fascist movement for an extensive period of time, “with the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the mass party system,... things began to change” (Foot 10). In fact, most of the 
members of these parties were prosecuted or even attacked by radicals from each side. For 
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instance, in 1978, the President of the Christian Democratic party was abducted and killed by 
revolutionists.  
Therefore, the political environment in Italy was once again broken. Only this time, the 
Italian people had no trust in any established party or organization running the government. This 
made Italy vulnerable to a new populist leader: Silvio Berlusconi. In 1994, he appealed to 
Italians with his lack of political background and strong business success. Along with this, he 
endeared himself to the middle-class with his conservative populist rhetoric that called for lower 
taxes and anti-communist principles. Not long after, he was elected as Prime Minister due to his 
independent party origins. In this way, Berlusconi gained support from both the left and the right, 
including those still holding views of neo-fascism. Therefore, it can be deduced that it was 
“Berlusconi who brought back neo-fascists into the political fold…, making an agreement with 
the National Alliance and with another populist grouping..., Lega Nord” (Foot 11).  
Although, during this term, Italians did not find any new and positive initiatives taking 
place like they were promised. Instead, there was little to nothing being done in favor of the 
Italian middle-class because Silvio Berlusconi displayed more favoritism towards his own social 
class.. After long periods of inaction, in 2008, the global financial crisis devastated the economy. 
This crisis, at a time when Italy’s economy had already been declining due to an inability to 
compete in global markets, compounded the decline even further.  
In fact, it would eventually lead “the Italian economy to experience a triple-dip 
recession… leaving the country's gross domestic product (GDP) at around 6 percent below its 
2008 pre-crisis peak” (Lachman). Naturally, Italian citizens assumed that their unfortunate 
reality would provoke a long awaited response from Berlusconi, being that his political campaign 
Clark 19 
ran off the idea of providing economic stability. Instead, the Prime Minister responded with 
reassurances that the crisis was not as bad as people perceive it to be. Finally, after many 
different scandals, and a lack of governmental action during the crisis, he was forced out of 
office in 2011.  
Along with the financial crisis, there was another global threat to Italy’s national stability 
that was to follow only a couple years later. In 2011, the Syrian Civil War erupted, when 
pro-democracy demonstrations broke out, but were attacked by the existing government militia. 
From that point on, the unrest spread throughout and the safety of civilians was compromised. 
Inevitably, in 2015, conditions became unbearable for millions of families and resulted in  “the 
largest annual flow of asylum seekers to Europe since 1985” (Connor). Therefore, it is Europe 
who defines their current immigration status as a “refugee crisis”.  A refugee, according to the 
1951 Geneva Convention, is “someone forced to leave their country in order to escape war, 
persecution, or natural disaster”. Notably, tensions have been rising throughout the EU “because 
of the disproportionate burden faced by some countries, particularly where the majority of 
migrants have been arriving: Greece, Italy and Hungary” (“Migrant Crisis”).  
Due to its geographical location on the Mediterranean, Italy was not only an entry point 
for illegal immigration, but now, for asylum seekers. However, given the existing economic 
disruptions and widespread unemployment plus the need for national reconstruction following 
2008, Italy did not respond well to the immigrant influx. In fact, regions and provinces that had 
been consistently left-wing, quickly switched their political identity. An example of this, is the 
province of Cascina, which had been a loyal bastion to the Communist ideology since the end of 
the dictatorship of Mussolini. Specializing in fine household furniture, the economic crisis and 
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monopoly of global companies destroyed the local economy. That being said, Cascina citizens 
were angered in 2014, when a few hundred refugees “who made it across the Mediterranean 
attempt[ed] to eke out a living, waiting in vain for something to turn up” (Coman). 
Regions all over the nation were developing very similar experiences and responses. By 
2014, about 600,000 refugees would have entered the borders of Italy, relying upon a social 
infrastructure unable to provide for circumstances forthcoming (Coman). To emphasize this 
growing resistance to immigration, Gianfranco Baldini of the University of Bologna makes an 
important point: 
You have to go back to 2011. That’s when western governments decided to bring 
down [Muammar] Gaddafi. Libya was of course a dictatorship, but you had 
someone to deal with. It was inconceivable that Gaddafi would ever have allowed 
huge numbers of people to travel through Libya to cross to Italy as a means to get 
to Europe from Africa and the Middle East. So the immigration crisis began there. 
(Coman) 
Therefore, with an already established history with unregulated migration flows, Italians 
developed a common intolerance for opening their borders. Not because it was based on the 
premise of discrimination, but as a natural result to the government failing to provide for existing 
citizens during the constant state of economic downturn. In other words, “Italy’s national debt 
was huge” following 2008, and President Giorgio Napolitano decided to “appoint unelected 
officials... [such as] the former European Commissioner Mario Monti” to restore the economy 
(Coman).  However, the plan to raise taxes and cut government spending only resulted in high 
unemployment during a recession. Moreover, such an influx of refugees in this particularly 
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unstable economy did not prove to be beneficial for Italian citizens nor the migrants seeking 
asylum.  
With this, it is important to fully understand the role of the nation-state and how this 
immigration status increases the number of conflicting nations within it. First, a distinction must 
be made apparent between the two terms. The nation can be defined as any “social group linked 
through common descent, culture, language, or territorial contiguity” (Ritzer 108). Whereas, the 
term nation-state includes the aspects of a nation, but also the political structure of a state. In 
other words, a nation-state can be made up of many different nations (sub-groups), but are 
identified as one because they are citizens of the same overarching government.  
However, since the refugees are coming from the Middle East, their culture and values 
are very distinct from that of Western culture. Provided this, even though they may legally 
immigrate into the nation-state, they will identify as their own nation and never fully assimilate 
unless extreme social programs are put into place. This conflict in the relationship of nations and 
the nation-state is very critical for the political attitude of the citizens of the host country. 
Moreover, the extreme diversity can be seen as a threat to the conventional culture. 
Quickly, the Syrian war became a global crisis, which meant that European states directly 
facing border control problems looked to organizations like the European Union (EU) and the 
United Nations (UN) to assist. Geographically, Italy’s location on the Meditteranean and their 
EU membership has made them one of the most vulnerable to asylum seekers. Moreover, the 
government needed assistance not only with border security, but with accommodating incoming 
refugees because “EU member states have made long-term legal commitments under 
international human rights and refugee law” (Metcalfe-Hough 3). However, because the crisis 
Clark 22 
erupted so quickly and at such a rate, there was a lack of response by the EU governments. In 
addition, the EU attempted to release pressure from main destination countries, but “the core 
issue – the number admitted – is a national decision, and there are stark differences among 
member states in the regulation and level of compliance with EU Directives on asylum” 
(Metcalfe-Hough 4). Given this, many EU countries had the privilege of closing their borders 
due to their geographical location away from the Meditteranean, shaking Italy’s confidence in 
the EU’s equitable treatment of a founding member.  
Even though the European Union members enjoy profound benefits, supranational 
governance is not an easy task because of the limitations of sovereignty. When nation-states 
bring different leaders and interests to the bargaining table, it is inevitable that compromise will 
be necessary. Notably, euroscepticism has recently become a trend all over Europe after global 
crises have erupted, exposing the effects of globalism and allowing nationalism to erupt in 
various forms. The objective of the Eropean Union is not to fulfil the specific interests of each 
member state, but to provide them benefits including, but not limited to: a common market, 
international peace, and political progress. However, in order for this to occur, the EU must 
respect the boundaries of each member state. 
Along with this, for member states to resolve issues through this global governance 
system, Europe needs to remain a priority for their agenda, being it is a union that requires 
cooperation. This is important in understanding how euroscepticism has become a phenomenon 
because national political parties, specifically right-wing populist, have gained support using 
anti-European Union rhetoric, transitioning their national agendas away from a European 
perspective. Although Italy, a founding member, has an existing controversy in regards to their 
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economic infrastructure and border control, it has been highlighted due to the recent years of 
global turmoil, enabling the right-wing populist party, Lega, to rise through an anti-globalization 
platform.  
As a prerequisite, it is necessary to define what it means to be European before one can 
understand the degree to which it is rejected. There are many different ways to measure how a 
European considers himself such as European integration, sense of European community, or 
European identity. However, it can be argued that European identity is the best indicator for 
Europeanism because of its ability to measure the correlation between Euro-consciousness and 
fundamental personal identities. Moreover, in order to analyze trends of Europeanism, one can 
observe the Moreno question that has been included in the eurobarometer since 1992 (Serricchio 
116).  
Even though this question has been adjusted overtime, its premise remains valid with 
regard to whether people only feel attached to their national identity, if they claim both, or solely 
a European identity. In this respect, there has been a declining trend for Italy as seen from data 
collected by the eurobarometer “between 1992 (when 73 percent of respondents showed some 
form of Europeanidentity) and 2006 (65 percent)” (Serricchio 116). Clearly, Italians have felt 
more of an emphasis on their nationality and less of one on their Europeanism. This trend only 
becomes more negative in the following years after the 2008 Great Recession and Migration 
Crisis in 2015. In fact, Italians cannot be counted as being among the “most Euroenthusiastic; on 
the contrary, they are located towards the bottom of the classification” (Serricchio 117). 
Therefore, Italy has become an interesting case study for the rise of euroscepticism.  
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In order to fully explore this notion, one must establish what euroscepticism exactly 
refers to, being it is often conceptualized as an umbrella that encompasses many different 
emotions and sentiments against the EU. Therefore, it has developed the broad meaning of 
“questioning European integration and it is this usage that has also become established in 
political science” (Verney 4). By way of expansion, this does not just refer to one position 
against EU politics, but a range of antagonisms to the EU integration process. However, authors 
such as Kopecky & Mudde (2002) have suggested a more narrow definition that does not include 
those that reject the EU entirely; they consider that to be an entirely different category (Verney 
4). For research purposes, the first and more broad definition is most sufficient in accounting for 
all degrees of contestation toward European integration, whether it is to an extreme or not.  
Ushering in the contemporary political climate, global threats of financial downturn and 
immigration resulted in Italy’s trust in the European Union to greatly diminish. Although, 
Euroscepticism was not a foreign term before these global crises erupted; it first became apparent 
in 1991, when the Maastricht Treaty officially created the European Union. This treaty became 
very controversial for the member states due to its attempt to create something much greater than 
the European Economic Community (EEC). To elaborate, the treaty was seen as a supranational 
constitution that could challenge national sovereignty with “its economic prescriptions… for 
national redistributive policies, and… an erosion of national identity aggravated by the project 
for European citizenship” (Verney 1).  
Due to the success of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) transitioning into 
the EEC in 1957, neo-functionalists predicted that the integration into the European Union 
wouldn’t be any different. Ernst Haas developed the neo-functionalist theory based on the notion 
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that member states would continue to subside their sovereignty for the greater benefits obtained 
through cooperation. In this way, the benefits of one interest would eventually integrate others 
until full European integration could be reached. Clearly, this theory, however, did not account 
for the contestation that would take place among member states in 1991. 
Therefore, after much criticism of the Maastricht Treaty, ‘Post-Functionalist’ theory was 
developed by Hooghe and Marks to address relevant factors that may actually hinder European 
integration. In this new theory, they argued that public opinion was ignored initially because it 
was the elite representatives at the integration bargaining table. However, it is eurosceptic public 
protests that have now created “a limited zone of acquiescence for policy choice” (Verney 2). 
Adapting to the flux of public interest and demands, Hooghe and Marks acknowledge that the 
integration process is not always a forward moving cycle, and new political actors may become 
relevant as a response. In this case, they have identified the growing relevance of public 
consensus on European integration as an obstruction to the EU decision makers.  
Provided this, there has also been a particular rising phenomenon of skepticism 
associated with the European Union: elite skepticism. On this notion, there is an identification of 
‘politics of fear’ being used by the elites. Although fear mongering may be considered one of the 
fundamental principles of politics, Mudde acknowledges the type of fear the European elites 
have reinforced. Specifically, the EU elite have continually warned “against alleged threats from 
so-called ‘anti-Europeans’, by which they mostly mean eurosceptics” (Mudde 79). By instilling 
this fear of anyone exhibiting Eurosceptic tendencies, they attempt to de-legitimize these anti-EU 
sentiments by ‘othering’ them.  
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In other words, traditional mechanisms, where the opponents are homogenized and an 
apocalyptic future is presented by which the elites’ policies can only solve, are then made 
apparent (Mudde 79). Although ‘opponents’ may in fact be perpetuating nationalistic tendancies, 
it is common for all critics of the EU to be charactorized as “anti-European populists that are 
‘nationalist’ or even ‘anti-democratic’, while the future is one of political crises, or worse, war” 
(Mudde 79). By “othering” this opposition group, support against eurosceptics may increase, but 
it will also intensify the opposition by acknowledging them as a legitimate political identity 
group. In this way, Hooghe and Marks’ Post-Functionalist theory proves verifiable because with 
increasing pressure on the EU by public disapproval, integration may not progress as expected.  
Thus, as distrust in the elite grew, along with the supranational powers ratified in the 
Maastricht Treaty, Italian trust in the European Union remained inconsistent. In 1999, public 
support dropped even further, “with specific reference to the single currency, which represented 
a landmark in the process of European integration” (Quaglia 44). Not only was removing the 
Italian national currency a symbolic devastation, but the implications of the transition period 
resulted in a long-lasting effect on the economy. Furthermore, the effect of low economic growth 
since joining and “the rather sharp increase in consumer prices can generally be held to account 
for public disaffection vis-a`-vis the euro” (Quaglia 45). In this way, the euroscepticism at this 
time was deeply-rooted in an economic premise.  
By 2008, when the Great Recession transpired, Italy was heavily impacted due to their 
already weakened economy. For this reason, the turmoil resulting from this global crisis was 
often connected to familiar discontent with the European Union’s previous financial impact. 
Along with this, the ruling party, Forza Italia, and their close partner, Lega Nord, were both 
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center-right political parties, “characterised by the use of a populist discourse which juxtaposes a 
pure honest common people against a corrupt self-serving political elite” (Ruzza and Fella, 5). 
Although, their focus on a liberal economy and nationalistic sentiments were not directly 
addressing the European Union, they were certainly not conditioning Italians to be 
‘Euroenthusiastic’.  
Due to the nature of populism, the European Union can easily find itself as a target or 
scapegoat, being it is often regarded as institutions made up of the ‘European elite’. In this 
ideology and its use of rhetoric, it is “the virtues of ‘the people’ [that] are asserted in opposition 
to a corrupt political class to which the right presents itself as the main opponent” (Ruzza and 
Fella, 8). Therefore, right-wing populist claims revolve around an anti-establishment premise, 
which radicalize mainstream ideas of Western democracy. Even though this government could 
not sustain itself much longer due to a series of political scandals, the remnants of populist 
agendas did not diminish. In fact, they intensified as the effects of global turmoil infiltrated more 
aspects of Italian society.  
That being said, the country became vulnerable to right-wing populism once again. Only 
this time, it was in the form of two parties: Beppe Grillo’s “Five Star Movement” (M5S) and 
Matteo Salvini’s “Lega”. From March 2018 until September 2019, the coalition between the two 
held a majority in parliament with Salvini serving as Deputy Premier and Interior Minister. 
Although they both rose to power from similar political factors, what makes Lega so distinct is 
how it has transformed under its new leader. For M5S, it was developed by Grillo, a comedian, 
in 2009 as a direct result of the current political climate; a traditional populist party foundation. 
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Whereas, Salvini became the face of this established party by changing its objectives to fit a far 
right-wing populist agenda.  
The origin of the party was actually founded by Umberto Bossi in 1991, making it the 
oldest one in the Italian Parliament (Edwards). It was founded under the name “Lega Nord”, 
which directly translates to “The Northern League”. At this time, this name was deemed 
appropriate given the party was only focused on defending “the interests and prejudices of small 
businesses in Italy’s North” (Coman). During this phase under Bossi’s leadership, he advocated 
what is known as “fiscal federalism”. In other words, he believed specific political regions of the 
North should be able to keep more of their tax revenues and capitalize on free market success.  
Specifically, the geographical area that the regionalist party was referring to is called 
“Padania”, which refers to the Po Valley in Northern Italy. Moreover, the geographical area is 
not a politically recognized region, but an area that encompasses where most of Italy’s GDP is 
produced. Due to the unitary system that the government exhibits, the people in this area became 
upset with their contributions to the economy being allocated through public services, mainly 
ending up in the South. Because the nation’s North and South divide has developed into not only 
an educational and economic division, but a cultural one, Lega Nord gained much support in 
trying to gain independence for this wealthy ‘region’.  
To emphasize how great the difference in GDP per capita between the Northern regions 
and the South, Figure 1 compares the main cities of Milan, Rome, Turin, Naples, and Palermo. 
Clearly, Milan produces the most GDP overall, which is more than twice as much as the two 
main cities in the South, Naples and Palermo. In fact, this comparison in terms of national 
economies would mean “Milan is richer than Sweden [and] Naples is poorer than the Czech 
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Republic” (Gillet). Although Rome is not a part of the “Padania” region, it is the nation’s capital. 
Turin is not traditionally referred to as apart of Lega Nord’s ‘exclusive’ region either, but it is 
located in the Northwest of Italy, where economic prosperity is much higher.  
Figure 1: 
 
Source: Gillet (2010) 
Therefore, there is an evident line between the North and South that Lega Nord tried to 
strengthen in the political world through independence. Naturally, however, the derogatory 
rhetoric about the South also added to the stereotypes linked to the economic social gap between 
the two. Provided this, the North began to develop a reputation of contempt as they circulated 
this negative rhetoric about the ‘other group’ in the South. Negative terms such as “terroni” 
became traditional ways to refer to the South that excluded them from the party’s constituency. 
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Both, Umberto Bossi and Matteo Salvini, had sustained negative rhetoric about the South, 
reinforcing stereotypes and prejudice.  
In addition, something that was in contrast to the leaders of the “political parties that had 
dominated post World War II Italian politics [was that] Bossi presented himself as a man of the 
people in his appearance and speech” (Zaslove 3). This was fundamental to the party’s success, 
and remains prevalent through the reign of Salvini. In doing so, a much larger audience can be 
reached, being that the leaders portray themselves as relatable citizens. Moreover, the party 
maintained much success and following until April of 2012. It was in this year that Umberto 
Bossi was forced to resign due to scandals of embezzlement (Albertazzi). After nearly 
twenty-one years, his leadership of the regionalist party had come to an abrupt end, prompting 
the 2013 election of Matteo Salvini.  
At first, forty-year-old Matteo Salvini fulfilled the position appealing to the same 
political rhetoric as his predecessor. However, he soon realized the fault in doing so. Due to the 
political climate he was elected into, he realized the current upsets were no longer unique to a 
specific region, but had become ubiquitous throughout the nation. Therefore, he re-established an 
anti-globalization platform that could appeal to all Italians. In fact, after his first speech, Salvini, 
apologized to Southerners claiming that “either Italy saves itself as a nation, or else all of its 
regions, without exception, will face ruin” (Albertazzi). Breaking down this well-established 
division among the party’s support, surprisingly, did not take long. Currently, Lega has been 
gaining great support in the central regions of Italy “that had once been dominated by the left, 
and also managing to establish a presence in the South – a ‘no-go area’ for the Lega under Bossi” 
(Albertazzi).  
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Moreover, the stress of the “Nord” was dropped from the original name, unifying the 
different regions under the new “Lega”. With this, Salvini’s popularity quickly grew from his 
very blunt stances on the immigration crisis. For instance, at his first big rally in Rome there was 
a banner reading, “Stop the Invasion” (Stille). Clearly provoking xenophobia around the issue, he 
gained a media spotlight from both pro and anti stances. Using this to his advantage, Salvini 
embraced a Facebook-centered communication to the public, making him a social media 
sensation. In the latter half of 2015, alone, he “tripled his Facebook following: capitalising on the 
refugee crisis and growing discontent with Matteo Renzi’s centrist government” (Stille). As a 
slightly younger politician, Salvini has been able to effectively transform the entire formality of 
politics into the social media commons.  
Clearly, the political tone had changed and Italians resonated with it. Due to the party’s 
established presence in government, the new and extreme rhetoric of Salvini “managed to also 
attract new media attention”, extending his platform across the nation in various forms (Camus 
and Leebourg 183). Even if mainstream media was covering Salvini’s remarks and speeches in a 
negative way, it enabled his party’s new leadership to be apart of common political discussion. 
Given his audiance, the claims he makes can have an immense effect, which is why his 
anti-immigration and even xenophobic remarks such as “the Africanization of Europe” can 
provoke nativism (Camus and Leebourg 183). 
 More specifically, Lega and their new leader, Matteo Salvini, changed the direction of 
their party’s agenda in order to address this current state of turmoil. There was a shift away from 
regional autonomy and towards opposition against immigration, the EU, and refugees arriving in 
Southern Italy. By doing this, Salvini’s party began to systematically delegitimize the EU, which 
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became evident in the publication of the 2014 Manifesto. Direct remarks highlighted the “EU’s 
democratic deficit, whereby the sovereign people of individual member states were considered to 
have lost out from the EU’s lack of accountability” (Pirro and van Kessel 332). By including this 
in the document, Lega proved their long standing ‘soft’ euroscepticism was transitioning to a 
more ‘hard’ stance. 
As Figure 3 displays, the ideological shift can be observed from the Facebook posts of 
Lega Nord and Matteo Salvini. Although both experience a decrease of promoting Northern 
values, needs and interests, it is evident that these posts had declined since 2014 for Salvini, 
whereas, they did not begin to decline until 2016 for the official party account. Along with this, 
both have increased their posts for national values, needs, and interests since 2014, but Salvini’s 
at a much more consistent and faster rate.  
 
Source: Albertazzi (2018) 
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As the 2018 general elections were approaching, his main campaign was not only on 
immigration, but improving Italy’s financial reality. In order to do so, he adamantly advocated 
for two proposals. First, a flat tax that would successfully reduce “rates to 15% or 20%, a huge 
cut from Italy’s comparatively high taxes” (Stille). Secondly, Salvini hoped to abolish the law 
that established a new retirement age at sixty-six. Both of these proposals strongly embody 
enticing rhetoric to the Italian middle-class’ finances, but also appear quite hollow. The first in 
terms of a collapsing social infrastructure, and the last due to the very high life expectancy of 
Italians. In fact, Italy is recorded to have “the highest life expectancy in Europe (83 years); 
[therefore], lowering the retirement age seems to most economists pure folly” (Stille). 
Thus, the main premise of Salvini’s Lega has been focused on addressing the economic 
and immigration crises. It has allowed him to emphasize the threat of globalization as a whole, 
transforming it into a critique on Italy’s role in the international community and, more 
specifically, the European Union. Moreover, as a result of the consensus surrounding these 
global issues, Italians have found themselves struggling to understand what the relationship 
between the nation-state and intergovernmental institutions should be. Interestingly, this power 
struggle is not unique to just the current state of Italy, but to countries throughout Europe 
experiencing similar impacts of globalization. As one can observe from “Brexit”, there is a 
common political scapegoat that right-wing populists have identified: the European Union.  
Considered to be one of the most evident indicators of the party’s transition to a hard 
euroscepticism was Salvini’s attack on the Euro. Understanding the global connection that could 
be made to the economic recession, he accused Italy’s eurozone membership as a main 
component in destabilizing the nation’s economic prosperity. In doing so, one of his renowned 
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slogans became “Out of the Euro. Now!’, which gained support for its criticism of the specific 
beneficiaries of the one currency (Pirro and van Kessel 332). To elaborate, Salvini consistently 
states that Italy is being forced to use “a currency allegedly set up to advantage the German 
economy” (Albertazzi).  
Naturally, Italian citizens became unsettled by this idea of being a tool used to advantage 
another country’s economic prosperity, transforming support for the party from “4 percent in the 
legislative elections of 2013 to 13 percent in the regional elections of 2015” (Camus and 
Leebourg 183). However, it does not take into consideration the enormous public debt and lack 
of development that makes abandoning the euro so unrealistic. Moreover, even though there is 
heavy criticism and threats to pull away from the EU, it is very unlikely to occur. Although, 
Salvini can be successful in pressuring the decisions and policies that are implemented by the EU 
through his national government influence.  
Particularly, in understanding the case of euroscepticism in Italy, the growing support of 
far-right wing parties has become extremely relevant. Although it did not seem this way before 
the turn of the decade in 2011, when Verney assumed  that “euroscepticism [would] remain, as it 
always has been, relatively marginal in South European public opinion, with hard euroscepticism 
representing a small group” (Verney 26). Clearly, there has been an unpredicted and dramatic 
shift in public opinion that has enabled these parties to even succeed in influencing government, 
which could then directly impact European integration. 
Moreover, as the support for far right-wing populism grows in Europe, there can be an 
assumption that it will produce a positive relationship with euroscepticism. Trust in national 
governments must remain strong in order for that support to translate into the EU because the 
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“most important decisions… are made via the intergovernmental route” (Boomgaarden et al. 
252).  In other words, if there is a positive attitude and trust towards the national government, 
then citizens can trust that they are being represented on a European level. However, as one can 
observe in the populist nature of attacking the current government, they will successfully 
deteriorate that trust, which can then, in turn, erode into European trust.  
Although this research is specific to Italian euroscepticism, it is not particularly unique to 
this case study. In fact, a very current and more radical example of increased euroscepticism can 
be observed in the recent events surrounding Brexit. Even though the United Kingdom was never 
considered as ‘Euroenthusiastic’ as Italy, the timeline of events that propelled right-wing 
populism to put forth a legitimate notion of euroscepticism reveals a similar trend. Through both, 
the UK and Italy, one can emphasize the importance of national politics, since most “citizens 
lack the basic information to make up their minds about the EU and therefore resort to proxies 
from national politics” (Boomgaarden et al. 251). 
In the earlier years, Lega Nord was regarded to have been “successful where others failed 
by balancing political power with its populist identity” (Zaslove 158). For many years, Umberto 
Bossi had a good relationship with Silvio Berlusconi, the Prime Minister at the time. That being 
said, this relationship allowed Lega Nord to be critical of the ruling party, yet still maintain its 
political influence. In fact, under Bossi, Lega had “structure and agency, which gave them 
strength in areas that most right-wing populist parties lack” (Zaslove 159). Provided this, 
previously established supporters from Bossi’s original Lega, enabled Matteo Salvini’s rise of 
populism to occur with startling rapidity.  
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Although the party’s aim was changed drastically, by speaking out on the current fears 
circulating throughout Italy, voters remained loyal alongside new ones, effectively transitioning 
the regionalist party of the North into a nationally supported movement. As the results in table 2 
display, electoral support for Lega by region from 2013 and 2018, experienced an overall 
increase throughout the entire peninsula. Notably, in 2013 the only regions with outlying 
electoral support were Lambardy (12.9%) and Veneto (10.5%). However, by 2018, Salvini was 
able to obtain votes in twelve regions where his percentage of votes were not even 1%. For 
instance, Umbria nearly experienced a 20% increase from .6%, while Lombardy and Veneto 
remain the strongest support with close to around 30%.  
 
Source: Albertazzi (2018) 
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Clearly, Salvini has made his political presence well-known throughout Italy and even 
“come to dominate the entire right of Italian politics” (Johnson). Even though it was their 
coalition partner, the Five Star Movement, who received the largest percentage of votes in 2018, 
it was Salvini who became the main face of their movement. Because M5S was a newly evolved 
populist party, they did not have much practical government experience. Whereas, Lega, the 
oldest party in parliament, presented significant capabilities within the government. Along with 
this, Salvini was appointed Interior Minister, which allowed him to carry out measures 
addressing his most popular campaign issue: immigration. Therefore, Salvini was able to 
continue his anti-globalization platform and actually act on those claims politically. Italian 
citizens recognized this and began to feel as though Matteo Salvini was their ‘savior’ out of this 
continuing state of turmoil.  
That being said, in just one year, the majority of votes began to switch in favor of Salvini 
instead of the M5S, with Lega polling “at 34 percent…, and double the level of his nearest rival, 
the centre-left Democratic party” (Johnson). Knowing this, Salvini began to challenge Prime 
Minister, Giuseppe Conte, and the M5S on numerous accounts in hopes to force a snap elections. 
In other words, if the coalition ended, the majority in Parliament would no longer exist, making 
an election necessary for a functioning government. With such significant poll numbers, Salvini 
was confident that the vote would be in favor of his party and lead to his appointment as Prime 
Minister. Therefore, Salvini formally ended the alliance by early August of 2019; a strategy that 
seemed promising, but that did not deliver.  
On August 20th, Guiseppe Conte issued his official resignation as Prime Minister with a 
statement claiming Matteo Salvini to be “an ‘opportunist’ for triggering a government crisis that 
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could have ‘serious consequences’ for Italy” (Giuffrida). Despite the derogatory claims about 
Lega and their leadership, Salvini saw his plan as beginning to unfold. In fact, it was predicted 
that “Mr. Salvini would not only easily become Prime Minister, but that a coalition of the 
League, the post-fascist Brothers of Italy and the remainder of Mr Berlusconi’s Forza Italia 
would command an absolute majority in parliament” (Johnson). The support for this new “Italian 
right” seemed to be inevitable for the new government.  
Moreover, the Five Star Movement had announced their new coalition partner only a 
week later to be the center-left Democratic Party, re-appointing Guiseppe Conte as Prime 
Minister. A turn of events that no one had predicted due to the established contestation between 
the two opposing parties. Provided this, the newly formed coalition did not seem reliable in 
producing an alliance conducive for Italy’s future. Thus, it became clear that the newly formed 
government had developed solely based on an attempt to block Salvini from gaining ultimate 
power. However, although Salvini was unprepared for such a turn of events, he still cannot be 
discounted as a factor in Italy’s political calculus. 
 There is still much promise with his growing support and the clear vulnerability of the 
ruling coalition. For this reason, Salvini has changed his strategy to focus on upcoming regional 
elections, which, since October 2019, have reinforced his capabilities. By way of expansion, 
Lega has targeted historically ‘Left’ regions such as Umbria and Emilia Romagna by appealing 
to the financial stagnation of these areas. Emilia Romagna is considered to be the “Heartland of 
the Italian Left”, so if Salvini can secure a vote in the regional government, it would be the 
“catalyst to bring down the government and force fresh national elections” (Johnson).With 
overarching regional support for Salvini, the new coalitional government could not be justified as 
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a representative government, providing more impetus for snap elections to occur. Therefore, 
Matteo Salvini has found an alternative and viable trajectory to becoming Prime Minister.  
 
Analysis: Salvini, a True Demagogue 
Throughout his rise to power, Salvini has been heavily criticized by respected individuals 
for the real consequences that come from “inciting hatred and legitimising facism”, alluding to 
periods of Mussolini (Albertazzi). However, Salvini and his movement are not concerned about 
these remarks as he reassures Italy’s democracy is not a target. Whereas, he argues that 
right-wing nationalism is a necessary response in order to protect the nation-state from current 
threats of globalization. In this case, the current political climate could foreshadow the 
nationalism Italy wants to re-enforce as European integration progresses.  
Supporting a Post-Functionalist perspective, it could be the limitations of public interests 
that are finally challenging the established political systems reinforced by the elite. Although, the 
prejudice against supranational institutions that is mobilized by this  ‘politics of fear’ does not 
prove genuine by most leaders of these populist parties. Instead, it is evident these leaders are 
utilizing current fears as their means to an end of ultimate political power. In order to fully 
understand and support this argument, a thorough analysis of the specific mechanisms employed 
by the political leader must be carried out. Therefore, for this case study of the contemporary 
career of Matteo Salvini, in order to authentically define him as a demagogue, his technique must 
affirm and reinforce the underlying principles of the unholy trinity--Fear, Prejudice, Ignorance.  
As previously established, sophistry is a fundamental tool for the demagogue to justify 
himself as an authentic politician. However, for that to occur, the social and political conditions 
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must be conducive for his anti-establishment rhetoric. In 2013, the beginning of Salvini’s career 
as a political leader, the growing distrust of government transformed his vision of Lega Nord into 
a right-wing populist. When a constituency is not reassured that their interests are being served 
by a “political establishment that purports to represent it fairly, a lying demagogue can appear as 
a distinctively authentic champion of its interests” (Hahl et al. 3). Therefore, the aftermath of the 
Great Recession and the Migration Crisis, had left Italian citizens upset with the lack of 
government initiative to protect their interests.  
With this pre-existing political climate, the instability of Italian trust became relevant for 
Salvini’s movement. Identifying that the dissatisfaction with the Italian government  remained 
consistent throughout, he no longer focused on regional autonomy, but, instead, on what could 
render him the most support. Provided this, immigration, the European Union, and the political 
elite became necessary targets to extend his support across the whole peninsula. By establishing 
these three scapegoats, Salvini convinced his constituency that the current government 
surrendered to these pro-globalization agents at the cost of national interests. In other words, 
national interests needed to be reinforced and protected from global threats, implying that 
national and European interests directly conflict with one another. 
In a nation-state with very established history and culture, inciting nationalistic and even 
nativist emotions can be easier than in a country without. Therefore, using these deep-rooted 
emotions, Matteo Salvini emphasized the threat of immigrants and the EU in order to manipulate 
the existing prejudice. Although most Italians may not feel it to the extent of Salvini’s emphasis, 
his oratory has the potential to radicalize their feelings on these issues, given the period of 
instability. Provided this, his decision to completely dismantle the party’s objective clearly 
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identified an opportunity to manipulate the current political upset, giving birth to the new 
“Lega”. 
 In addition, the eurosceptic trend Italy had been clearly experiencing was another 
vulnerability that reinforced the nationalistic rhetoric of Matteo Salvini. In some form or another, 
Italians were experiencing similar opinions that resonated with his campaign strategy. Even 
though Salvini could be heavily criticized for explicit phrases, it also made many people perceive 
him “as bravely speaking a deep and otherwise suppressed truth” (Hahl et al. 3). Salvini 
dedicated his political identity to appeal to traditional sentiments of Italians because it was 
exactly what his audience wanted to hear. However, this does not necessarily mean he genuinely 
believes in the claims he insists upon.  
Authenticity is in fact a paradox characteristic of the demagogue. Although Salvini 
portrays himself as ‘a man of the people’, he not only excludes the views that he claims don’t 
align with “the people”, but also exploits the emotions of those he is “genuinely representing”. 
To emphasize, his strong stance on immigration, and even xenophobic remarks do acknowledge 
the mainstream issue of immigrantion, but in a way that does not accurately represent the reality 
of  the average Italian citizen. Instead, he transforms their opinion into a more radical version by 
appealing to the emotional aspects of the issue. Therefore, when analyzing the authenticity of 
Matteo Salvini, it cannot be made clear where his true judgement lies.  
However, what can be made apparent is the fundamental premise of deep-rooted 
prejudice surrounding nationalistic tendancies that enabled the success of the party’s 
transformation under Salvini, affirming the first stage of demagoguery. With such 
emotion-provoking campaigns, his charisma began to strengthen pathetic reasoning for all 
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political discussion, instilling the necessary state of ignorance conducive to his rising platform. 
To elaborate, the growing support for the claims made by Salvini such as his overspeclatory 
claims on immigration and economic tendencies, reveal the lack of research and logical 
reasoning. 
Although both the North and South of Italy provided a condition of ignorance, they 
differed, to some degree, in respect to why. To emphasize, Lega Nord began as a party fighting 
for regional autonomy, characterized by derogatory rhetoric towards the South. Although Salvini 
did not follow this agenda for very long, he had made his sentiments clear about the South in the 
years prior to the party’s transition. In other words, Salvini, who had regularly used terms such 
as “terroni”, has now appealed to the South as if he could appropriately represent them. Due to 
the very established crisis of immigration especially in that region, Southerners only focused on 
his hard anti-immigration stance, and not at all on Salvini’s abrupt abandonment of judgement. 
Moreover, despite his reputation, he had successfully convinced the South of his patronage to 
them.  
As for the North, the support was not as unexpected due to his party’s platform that had 
already been established. However, it was unusual that the anti-EU rhetoric had become so 
popular and accepted in places that owe their political and economic prosperity to the Union’s 
common market and its regulations. Without taking this into account, the hard eurosceptic 
approach taken by Salvini appealed to these areas based on the nationalistic prejudice against 
global threats of an overarching supranational government. The appeal of his oratory derived 
from the feelings surrounding this prejudice, which then resonated with the anti-immigration 
stance that took hold of the South.  
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After almost two decades, the entire nation had experienced great socio-economic 
downturn. Therefore, when Salvini addressed complex issues of immigration and economic 
stagnation with a straightforward solution, Italians became hopeful. Using nationalistic 
sentiments, Salvini was able to convince both the North and South that globalization was at fault. 
While specifically targeting the South with anti-immigration views and the North with anti-EU 
rhetoric, the anti-globalization prejudice became self-reinforcing. In other words, Salvini’s plan 
to strengthen Italy’s policy making from the discretion of the European Union coincided with the 
ability to secure its borders from mass immigration.  
Notably, distancing Italy from the European Union became the main solution, even 
though the EU does not have authority over Italy’s border control and provides significant 
benefits to their economy. Salvini and his party have been prompt in blaming the 
intergovernmental institution for its role, yet unable to acknowledge the responsibility that Italy 
has for itself. For instance, the European Union Dublin Regulation has been most commonly 
criticized for its disproportionate impact on main EU-entry countries for migrants seeking 
asylum. The fact that it is a European regulation is publicized, but when it was updated and 
signed in 2003, Lega Nord and Forza Italia were apart of the ruling majority is not mentioned.  
Because Salvini obtained much of his support from average citizens with his populist 
appeal, the complexities of politics are most likely not understood. Therefore, the inability of 
most people to understand the logistics of the EU is exploited by Salvini, making it easy to use as 
a scapegoat. In fact, most members of the “mass audience are neither sophisticated nor 
well-educated”, so Salvini could only successfully unite them based on emotion (Gustainis 159). 
In this case, the emotion exploited was prejudice against the EU and immigrants, which became 
Clark 44 
mobilized through Salvini’s use of ‘politics of fear’. Especially in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession, arguably one of the hardest economic crisis in history, and the current migrant crisis, 
a phenomenon that assumed global dimensions, the vulnerability of Italians to the fear of 
globalization became nearly inevitable.  
As mentioned, Lega Nord always had elements of populism, but it wasn’t until Salvini’s 
leadership that it became the main identity for the party. Utilizing populist tendencies, Salvini 
was able to capture the mass audience he needed. Along with this, one area of “public concern 
especially vulnerable to exploitation...is racial and class hatred” (Gustainis 157). Since 
immigration is most threatening to those of a lower or middle class due to the type of job skills 
required, anti-immigration promises will appeal to both class and race contestation. Particularly 
in the South, where unemployment is high and education is declining, Italians will be least 
favorable towards lenient immigration policies. However, when Salvini makes xenophobic 
remarks such as the “Africanization of Europe”, the possible threats of immigration begin to 
develop into something much larger (Camus and Leebourg 183).  
To elaborate, remarks as such would create more than just a fear of job insecurity to those 
of the middle or lower class. Instead, Salvini’s attitude would construct a fear that implies Italian 
identity, culture, and economic stability are significantly at risk for all citizens. Criticizing the 
established government for allowing the European Union to take advantage of Italian interests, 
Salvini enforced a strong and hard-lined stance that would not surrender to any opposition. In 
addition, being a ‘man of the people’, Salvini’s character relies on the appearance of a ‘true 
Italian’, meaning he exhibits traditional Italian values relatable for his audience.  
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This appearance combined with his rhetoric made Italians feel as though their interests 
were important at a time that they seemed to be compromised, reinforcing the notion of a 
‘savior’. In other words, Salvini, himself, became the movement and solution. Therefore, once 
his campaign had obtained enough support to reach this point, Salvini became the most powerful 
political figure in Italy. Even though the explicit remarks he made would still be condemned by 
scholars, any media attention at all would contribute to his dominant identity. In fact, because 
most media sources are independent, news coverage is based on what generates the maximum 
amount of viewers. Thus, Salvini’s challenge to the political norm attracted most, if not all, 
media outlets to reinforce the legitimacy of his influence as a political leader.  
Manifesting this role as the ‘challenger to political norms’, Salvini does not contest with 
mainstream ideas, but instead, radicalizes them through deep-rooted emotions and then mobilizes 
them through fear. At a time of turmoil, Matteo Salvini was elected as the leader of Lega Nord. 
Recognizing the state of Italian politics, he cleverly identified the vulnerabilities of the common 
people that could be exploited. Furthermore, Salvini explicitly targeted the European Union and 
immigrants to conjure a fear that would threaten the nationalistic tendancies rooted in Italian 
culture and society. Instituting globalization as the greatest threat to the contemporary stability of 
the nation-state, this fear developed into a unifying agent for middle-class Italians, who then 
looked to a strong leader to protect them.  
 
Conclusion:  
In analyzing my research conducted in the case study of Matteo Salvini, the fundamental 
premise of demagogic politics was identified--Fear, Prejudice, Ignorance. This unholy trinity can 
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efficiently demonstrate the stages that are necessary in the establishment of an authentic 
demagogue. Although the context of contemporary politics is in constant flux, the opportunity 
that arises within specific contexts can still be identified through these three elements. Along 
with this, it was made evident that populism is a main proponent of constructing an environment 
vulnerable to demagogic politics due to its anti-establishment and illiberal democratic nature.  
The first pillar, prejudice, is necessary for the demagogue to generate deep-rooted 
antagonisms around the identified enemy. Next, this deep-rooted prejudice enables his 
constituency to suspend their logical reasoning, ignorance now becomes the coin of the realm. In 
this way, the demagogue can now advance his deceitful message both in terms of ethos and 
pathos. Lastly, the most foundational principle of the demagogue, fear. This third pillar 
reinforces both prejudice and ignorance because of its ability to mobilize these into a political 
movement. Whether the fear is constructed or legitimate, its implementation will persuade the 
audience of the demagogue’s absolute necessity in obtaining power.  
My analysis of the career of Matteo Salvini affirms his classification as an authentic 
demagogue according to the definitional standards of the unholy trinity. Evidently, Salvini has 
employed each stage: fear, prejudice, and ignorance. In this study, the consequences of 
globalization can be identified as the target of right-wing populism due to the remaining effects 
of global crises that have previously erupted. This surge of right-wing populism has sanctioned 
the use of explicit, xeneophobic rhetoric by Salvini, an ascending demagogue. His proliferation 
of these sentiments have then, in turn, provoked nativist repercussions among the population.  
Although my research is solely a case study on the career of Matteo Salvini, its limited 
parameters should not suggest Italy is an isolated case. Currently, right-wing populism has 
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developed into an expansive trend throughout Western Europe and the United States. In addition, 
the rhetoric promoted by these anti-establishment parties have all reinforced an anti-globalization 
stance. Not only is this significant with regard to the research on demagoguery, it also speaks to 
the long-term order and stability of Western Democracy. As in the case of Salvini, right-wing 
populism is conducive for demagogic politics to be employed, especially at a time when many 
countries are recovering from the negative impact of certain global trends. Without expanding 
our understanding of demagogic politics through contemporary manifestations, a sufficient 
understanding of this politically dangerous phenomenon cannot be established. 
Provided this, the limitation of my case study to develop a universal and applicable 
theory for demagogic politics exposes an external validity problem. Even though my research 
provides an extensive analysis of Italy’s demagogic politics, it is specific to that country alone 
and disregards any potential comparison cases. Moreover, my conclusion may prove relevant and 
contributive to the research of demagogic politics, but it cannot be used independently to 
formulate a universal theory.  In order to obtain this objective, a comparative analysis study or 
multi-case study would need to be performed.  
In addition, there is an internal validity problem with the fact that Italy’s right-wing 
political theatre is an on-going drama. Without the ability to know the outcome of the subject 
being analyzed, the literature will require consistent updates that may nullify initial conclusions. 
The inability to determine the outcome of Matteo Salvini’s career ensures an incomplete analysis 
of his conduct as an authentic demagogue. For this reason, my case study cannot claim to be 
fully comprehensive.  
Clark 48 
In conclusion, my extensive assessment of Matteo Salvini has verified his status as a 
demagogue. By displaying the three pillars of the unholy trinity--Fear, Prejudice, Ignorance--the 
political portrait reveals itself as being naturally demagogic. However, although this research 
provides a sense of definition and identification, it does not propose a solution. Consequently, 
my case study can only offer a tentative suggestion for preventing a demagogue from becoming 
a palpable threat to contemporary democracy.  
The heavy emotional reliance needed to operationalize all three pillars of the unholy 
trinity seems to suggest that a reinforcement of education could function as an antidote to such 
phenomenon. Specifically, in terms of individuals’ approaches to knowledge: a critical standard 
must be implanted. If in fact “the truth will set you free”, then the attempted deceit by a 
politician may be deterred through a legitimately enlightened manifestation of the logos (John 
8:31-32), ie, a critical ability to decode the counterfeit words of politicians. Although, the 
potentials to abuse ethos and pathos cannot be completely subdued, we must strive to enhance 
both the integrity of the message and character of those conveying it. In the absence of this, 
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